An early election, alone, will not end the instability
Ukraine’s sparring president and parliament have agreed to hold early elections, ostensibly promising an end to the stand-off that began in early April when President Viktor Yushchenko issued a decree to dissolve parliament. However, the timing of an early election is contested and some of parliament’s smaller parties are eager to delay the process for as long as possible. More importantly, a fresh election would not solve the principal cause of political instability—the lack of clarity on the division of powers between parliament and president. In contrast to the electoral question, the constitutional one is unlikely to be solved this year.
Ukraine is inching towards a resolution of the crisis sparked in early April when President Viktor Yushchenko signed a decree, calling for a pre-term parliamentary election in late May, which was rejected by parliament. On May 4th Mr Yushchenko and the prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych, agreed that early elections would be held. However, this has failed to break the deadlock, as the dispute has now shifted to when the vote will occur. A working group of parliamentary parties has been constituted to reach a decision. But on May 10th Mr Yushchenko said it had become deadlocked; he called for a new format to reach a compromise on the timing of a new election.
Towards a compromise
The grounds for Mr Yushchenko's first decree appeared weak: he argued that the ruling coalition had acted unconstitutionally when in March it accepted a number of deputies who had defected from the parties that supported Mr Yushchenko during the 2004 "Orange revolution". (The constitution provides for coalitions to be composed of factions, rather than individuals.) As a result, there was a strong chance that the ponderous Constitutional Court, which is subject to political pressure from both sides, would have upheld the governing coalition’s appeal against the presidential decree.
At this point, Mr Yanukovych seemed in a stronger position--not least because he had refused to adopt the bills needed to finance an election. However, while the Court was still deliberating, Mr Yushchenko on April 26th issued a second decree, essentially overriding the first and calling early elections for June 24th. This decree seems to have a firmer constitutional basis, as it refers specifically to the article of the constitution allowing the president to dissolve parliament "if within thirty days of a single regular session the plenary meetings fail to commence". By the time of the second decree, thirty days had lapsed since the ruling coalition was reformed--unconstitutionally, goes the argument--by the inclusion of the individual defectors.
The main players appear to accept that a stalemate has been reached, and that a negotiated compromise is the only answer. In addition, the Constitutional Court is by now so discredited that it has largely lost its ability to act as an arbiter whose decisions will be accepted by all sides. However, negotiations on the timing and other provisions for the election can be expected to be protracted.
Stumbling blocks
Mr Yushchenko and his "Orange" ally, Yuliya Tymoshenko, are in favour of holding the vote as early as possible--if not at the end of June, then in July. However, Mr Yanukovych's Party of Regions (PoR) wants a later date, and is pushing for October or November. It is therefore in the PoR's interests for the special working group of parliamentary parties to take its time. Moreover, the "Orange" team have accused the junior members of the ruling coalition, the Socialist and Communist parties, of deliberately sabotaging the working group's activity. These parties are struggling in opinion polls and face the prospect of an early election with trepidation.
There are plenty of other subordinate issues that could hamper the working group's progress and delay elections. Mr Yushchenko has demanded that a number of laws be passed by parliament in order to facilitate the election, including a so-called "law on the binding mandate" (banning deputies from switching factions), and amendments to the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers. This law, which removes the president's right to nominate the foreign and defence ministers, was approved by parliament in January, but has been contested by Mr Yushchenko at the Constitutional Court.
The coalition and the opposition are additionally reported to be divided over whether early elections should be called on the basis of Mr Yushchenko's decrees, or by parliament. It is also possible that the coalition could substantially up the stakes by demanding that an early presidential election be held simultaneously with the parliamentary one (although Mr Yushchenko is extremely unlikely to agree to this, as his chances of re-election would be poor, any such proposal would delay proceedings still further).
A not-so-early election
It appears likely that the parliamentary election will be held nearer the October-November timeframe being demanded by the PoR. This would give the party time to mobilise its substantial financial resources (it is backed by big-business interests) to help secure a favourable election result.
Polls conducted since the crisis erupted suggest that the PoR, which won with 32.1% of the vote in 2006, would remain the largest party in parliament, with the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc (YTB) again coming second (22.3% in 2006). Although Mr Yushchenko's show of resolve in seeing through his demands for early elections could improve the standing of his party, Our Ukraine, it would again be likely to place third (it won just 14% of the vote in 2006).
The Socialist Party would be far from assured of a place in the next legislature, with most recent polls putting its backing below the 3% threshold for representation (it won 7% of the vote in 2006). However, the Communists (3.7% in 2006) would stand a better chance, as would a new party, People's Self-Defence, which is led by former interior minister and presidential advisor Yury Lutsenko. People's Self-Defence could take votes away from Our Ukraine and the YTB, as well as from the Socialists, but it would side with the "Orange" parties in any coalition-building. Nevertheless, on the basis of numbers, the PoR would have a clear advantage over the "Orange" parties in the formation of the next coalition government.
It’s the constitution, stupid
An early election is highly unlikely to solve Ukraine’s underlying political problem, unless it is accompanied by work to clarify the constitutional rules. This only appears possible through cross-party agreement: no coalition is likely to have the two-thirds majority needed to change the constitution unilaterally. However, the polarisation of the political landscape militates strongly against broad consensus on improving the constitution.
Even if the opposing sides decided to work towards this goal—Ms Tymoshenko said on May 5th that a working group would be set up—reaching an agreement could be expected to be an extremely lengthy and fraught process, judging by Ukraine's experience with prolonged constitution-making in 1991-96. It is conceivable that a national referendum could be held on what style of governance the population wants, but the complexities of drawing up the constitutional documentation would still remain. Legislative tinkering, such as parliamentary retraction of the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers, would only be a partial solution. Until there is more clarity on the constitutional rules, and universal respect for them, Ukraine will remain vulnerable to the periodic political crises that have afflicted it ever since the country became independent.
Source: economist.com
