Currently, the major Ukrainian Christian churches are:
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC-MP) under the Patriarch of Moscow of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Since 1990 the UOC-MP operates as an autonomous church (one step short of full autocephaly). The Metropolitan Volodymyr (Viktor Sabodan) is enthroned since 1992 as the head of the UOC-MP under the title Metropolitan of Kiev and all Ukraine.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kiev Patriarchy (UOC-KP) created in 1991, currently with unrecognized canonical standing among other Eastern Orthodox churches. Since 1995 UOC-KP is headed by Patriarch Filaret (Mykhailo Denysenko) who until 1991 was a Metropolitan of Kiev and All Ukraine under the ROC, which defrocked him in 1992 and excommunicated in 1997 "for schismatic activities".
The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), which re-established itself in Ukraine after independence from the Soviet Union, having survived in the diaspora after Soviet government suppression following its birth during the brief period in the aftermath of Bolshevik Revolution when Communists tolerated and at times even encouraged Ukrainian nationalism in the 1920s.
The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, re-established in independent Ukraine following the dissolution of the Soviet Union where its ban was actively supported by ROC. Since 2001 UGCC is headed by Major Archbishop and Cardinal Lubomyr Husar.
Additionally, a Roman Catholic church and various protestant churches currently hold a very small but growing membership in Ukraine.
The current divided and fluid situation traces its roots to the close connection between Orthodox church and the state in Tsarist Russia after the transfer of the Kiev Metropolitan see from the Patriarch of Constantinople to the Patriarch of Moscow in 1686. Some clerics and church historians, particularly in Ukraine, do not consider this transfer legitimate and claim it was attempted via the ecclesiastic crime of bribery by the Russian Church, then only recently elevated to patriarchal status, but eventually accepted under pressure from the Turkish Sultan. This development, they claim, resulted in a forced policy of Russification of Ukrainian Christianity. Gradually Russophile Orthodox clergy during the 18th and 19th centuries became dominant in Ukraine. Despite the fact that the transfer was and still is occasionally questioned in Ukraine, it gained a de-facto recognition and acceptance in the Eastern Orthodox communion by 300+ years of Ukrainian Orthodoxy remaining in the see of the Patriarch of Moscow.
After the Russian Revolution and the Russian Civil War the Bolshevik authorities initially tolerated and even encouraged Ukrainian nationalism following their victory in Ukraine. In 1921 a Sobor announced a new Autocephaly, and created the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) in Kiev with Metropolitan Wasyl Lupkivskyj ordained as a head of the UAOC. In the wake of the break up of the Russian Empire, Russian Orthodox church was seen as counterrevolutionary and pro-White by the Communists, and a Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church was founded with their encouragement in order to reduce the influence of patriarch Tikhon of Moscow whose position towards the revolution was strongly critical. The Soviet government later changed its religious policy and started to persecute UAOC along with the Russian Orthodox church.
On October 8, 1942 Archbishop Nikanor and Bishop Mstyslav (later a Patriarch) of the UAOC and Metropolitan Oleksiy (Hromadsky) of the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church concluded an Act of Union, uniting the two national churches at the Pochaev Lavra. Later German occupation authorities and pro-Russian hierarchs of the Autonomous Church convinced Metropolitan Oleksiy to remove his signature. Metropolitan Oleksiy was murdered in Volhynia on May 7, 1943 by the nationalist guerillas of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
The Russian Orthodox Church regained its general monopoly in the Ukrainian SSR after World War II following another shift in the official Soviet attitude towards Christian churches. As a result many started to accuse it of being a puppet of the Communist Party. After the suspicious death of Patriarch Tikhon, the UAOC and UGCC sought to avoid the transfer under the Moscow Patriarchy; something that Moscow tolerated until after World War II. At the state organized 1948 synod in Lviv (Lvov), some UGCC clergy were coerced into proclaiming the annulment of the 1596 Union of Brest thereby breaking the canonical ties with Rome and transferring under the Moscow Patriarchy. This move's acceptance was mixed. With many clergy members and lay believers turning to ROC, some adamantly refused. While the UAOC and UGCC church property in Ukraine was liquidated by the Soviet authorities or transferred to the ROC, many believers refused to accept liquidation of their churches and for nearly 40 years the UAOC and UGCC existed in Western Ukraine underground lead by the clergy members under the threat of prosecution by the Soviet state. Much of the UGCC and UAOC clergy not willing to serve in ROC emigrated to Germany, the United States, or Canada and the Patriarchate of Moscow could legally lay claim to any Orthodox church property that was within the territory of its uncontested jurisdiction, which it did.
The warm post-war attitude towards the Orthodox Church came to an end with Nikita Khruschev's "Thaw" programme, which included closing the recently opened Kiev's Caves Lavra. However in the west-Ukrainian dioceses, which were the largest in the USSR, the Soviet attitude was "softest". In fact in the western city of Lvov, only one church was closed. The Moscow patriarchy also relaxed its canons on the clergy, especially those from the former-uniate territories, allowing them, for example to shave beards (a very uncommon Orthodox practice) and conduct liturgy in Ukrainian instead of Slavonic.
In 1988 with the millennium anniversary of the baptism of Rus, there was yet another shift in the Soviet attitude towards religion, coinciding with the Perestroika and Glasnost programmes, the USSR apologized for all repressions towards religion and promised to return all property to the rightful owners. Although what began as a peaceful return of many closed church buildings (of course to the then ROC's Ukrainian Exarchate) in the central, eastern and southern Ukraine (as well as in other parts of the USSR), in the former-uniate regions of western Ukraine it was a different story. As UGCC survived in diaspora and in the underground they took their chance and were immediately revived in Ukraine, where in the wake of the Rukh movements the UOC-MP was viewed as a leftover of Soviet occupation, and bitter, often violent clashes over church buildings followed with the UOC-MP slowly losing its parishes to the UGCC. The UAOC also did not wait long and quickly followed suit. Sometimes possessors of Church buildings changes several times in the space of a couple of days. All Soviet attempts to pacify the almost-warring church parties were unsuccessful, especially after the UGCC's demand that all property that was held prior to 1939 would be returned (even though some it was Orthodox before the Unia came). It is now believed that the only real event which enabled to contain the schism in the former-uniate territory was the ROC's reaction of raising its Ukrainian Exarchate to the status of an autonomous church, which took place in 1990, and up until the break up of the USSR (late 1991) there was an uneasy peace in western Ukraine. However after the nation became independent, the question of an independent and autocephalous Orthodox Church arose once again and another schism was approaching.
What historians now see as the reason for the following events was the decision of the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Metropolitan of Kiev and all Ukraine Filaret to achieve total autocephalocy from the Russian Orthodox Church. To achieve that, with active support of the then president Leonid Kravchuk, he covertely organised a communion with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in case Moscow refused. The skeptical hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church called for a full council where this issue would have been discussed, upon arrival most of the clergy of the UOC who initially supported Filaret, openely critised this move and immediately the votes turned against him. In the end the council voted for Filaret to retire from his position which was confirmed by a swore. Upon returning to Kiev however Filaret carried out his reserve option, and Police aided by nationalist Paramilitaries supported him in retaining his rank. The UOC synod was quick to respond and in the eastern city of Kharkov elected a new leader, the Metropolitan Vladimir (Slobodan). From there most of the fate of control of church buildings was decided by the church parishes, but when most refused to follow Filaret, paramilitaries, especially in Volyn and Rovno Oblasts carried out raids bringing property under their control.
The UOC-MP, which operates in communion with the other Eastern Orthodox Churches still owns the majority of Orthodox church buildings in Ukraine and is predominant in eastern and southern Ukraine. The UGCC and the UAOC, on the other hand, have most of their communities in the western provinces (oblasts} of Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk. The UOC-KP has its communities scattered across Ukraine, though only in western areas do they outnumber those of the UOC-MP. The UOC-KP and especially the UAOC and UGCC have strong support in the Ukrainian diaspora.
