Ukrainian-Polish War in Galicia, 1918–19

Ukrainian-Polish War in Galicia, 1918–19. The Ukrainian-Polish War broke out in late 1918 as a result of the Polish rejection of Ukrainian efforts to establish an independent state—the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR)—in the wake of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The major issue of dispute in the conflict was control over eastern Galicia, a predominantly Ukrainian ethnic territory regarded by the Poles as an integral part of the historical Polish realm. As the boundaries of the new Polish state had not yet been established, and the ZUNR had not been granted international diplomatic recognition, the matter was ultimately reduced to a question of control by military force.

The outbreak of hostilities can be dated to 1 November, when Poles in Lviv organized resistance to Ukrainian efforts to take control of the city (see November Uprising in Lviv, 1918). Similar resistance by Poles to the Ukrainian takeover followed in Drohobych, Sambir, Jaroslaw, and Peremyshl. The Ukrainian government, in response, established the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA) as its regular military force. Until the end of December the war remained a series of local skirmishes that developed into a standoff in which the Poles controlled Lviv and certain territories east of the city. The command of the UHA did not possess an overall operational plan, and the Poles simply tried to maintain their position. By January 1919 the front stretched from Baligrod (Balyhorod), in the Carpathian Mountains, along the Khyriv–Peremyshl railway line (with the Poles in possession of Peremyshl) to Lviv (in Polish hands) and then looped around in a clockwise direction to the Uhniv–Rava-Ruska area, from which it went northward.

When the Polish government in Warsaw began to dispatch regular troops to eastern Galicia, the conflict assumed a new dimension. By January 1919, Polish numbers reached about 20,000 men. On 15 February the UHA (some 40,000 men) began a great offensive (the so-called Vovchukhy Operation) toward Lviv, the Peremyshl–Lviv railway line, Rava-Ruska, and Belz. By the end of the month a short armistice was being enforced by the Entente (as a result of negotiations by the Berthelemy Mission). On 2 March, however, the UHA renewed the attack and was able to encircle Lviv. On 19 March the Polish divisions broke through the Ukrainian lines in the region of Horodok (Lviv region) and retook the Lviv–Peremyshl corridor.

On 2 April the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference established a commission headed by Gen Louis Botha to arrange an armistice between Poland and Ukraine. The proposed demarcation line it suggested (Lviv to be on the Polish side, Drohobych and Boryslav, on the Ukrainian side) was accepted by the government of the ZUNR but rejected by the Polish government, which claimed the right to take over the whole of eastern Galicia.

By that time the Poles had acquired the means to enforce their will. On 17 March the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference had given permission for the army of Gen Jozef Haller (six divisions, with about 68,000 men) to be transferred from France to Poland for the express purpose of securing a frontier against potential Bolshevik attack. It was moved in April. Although the Polish prime minister, Ignacy Paderewski, had assured the council that the army would not be sent to eastern Galicia, the troops were nonetheless being deployed there by mid-May. On 14 May a Polish force of approx 50,000 men attacked from the regions of Peremyshl, Horodok (Lviv region), and Lviv; in six days it had occupied Turka, Drohobych, and Stryi in the south and Kaminka-Strumylova in the north (the Polish offensive also included Volhynia). By 27 May the Poles had taken Halych and Stanyslaviv and were making contact with the Rumanian troops which entered Pokutia. The protests of the Entente and the need to transfer the armed forces to the west (because of fears of a German attack against Poland) stopped the Polish offensive on the Brody–Zolota Lypa River line.

On 7 June the reorganized UHA (with Gen Oleksander Hrekov as commander in chief from 9 June) embarked upon the Chortkiv offensive, which in two weeks reached the Brody–Krasne–Peremyshliany–Hnyla Lypa River line. The UHA troops were now about 40 km from Lviv, but they began to run short of ammunition and provisions. At the same time the international situation of the ZUNR also changed for the worse: following the defeat of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic in Volhynia by the Red Army the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference empowered Poland (25 June) to take over the whole of eastern Galicia up to the Zbruch River in a move intended to block a potential Bolshevik onslaught to the west. The council, however, did not regard that resolution as a final decision on the political future of eastern Galicia.

After new Polish troops (under the command of Jozef Pilsudski) were transferred to the east, they commenced a decisive offensive on 28 June. On 5 July the Poles reached the line of the Strypa River, and on 15 July they seized Ternopil and the area on both sides of the Seret River. Despite the defeat the UHA forces (about 80,000 men, including 36,000 in the first line of the front) retained their combat readiness and on 16–18 July crossed to the eastern side of the Zbruch River, where the UNR Army was stationed. The government of the ZUNR also crossed the Zbruch River to Kamianets-Podilskyi.

Western Ukrainian National Republic

Western Ukrainian National Republic (Zakhidno-Ukrainska Narodnia Respublika, or ZUNR). A nation-state established on the Ukrainian ethnic territory of former Austria-Hungary on 19 October 1918 by the Ukrainian National Rada in Lviv. The Constitution of 13 November 1918 determined its name and defined the territory of the ZUNR as that which encompassed the Ukrainian regions of the Austrian crown lands (see Crown land) of Galicia and Bukovyna and the Transcarpathian Szepes komitat, Sros komitat, Zemplen komitat, Ung komitat, Bereg komitat, Ugocsa komitat, and Maramaros komitat (see Maramures region). A Ukrainian government took power on 1 November 1918 in Galicia (see November Uprising in Lviv, 1918), on 6 November in Bukovyna, and on 19 November in Transcarpathia. The governments in the last two territories were short-lived. In spite of the Ukrainian-Polish War in Galicia, 1918–19 the government of the ZUNR held out longest in eastern Galicia.

The Ukrainian National Rada, a legislative council, was the state's ruling body before the calling of the Constituent Assembly of the ZUNR. The State Secretariat of the Western Ukrainian National Republic was its executive branch. Its power was eventually transferred to the Dictatorship of the Western Province of the Ukrainian National Republic.

On 1 December 1918 the State Secretariat of the Western Ukrainian National Republic concluded a preliminary agreement with the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic on the union of the two Ukrainian states. The agreement was approved by the Ukrainian National Rada on 3 January 1919 and by the Directory on 22 January. The union was proclaimed in a special proclamation of 22 January. Thenceforth the ZUNR assumed the name Western Province of the Ukrainian National Republic. But the union was not fully implemented: the government bodies of the ZUNR continued to operate separately (see Dictatorship of the Western Province of the Ukrainian National Republic). When the government of the Ukrainian National Republic recognized Polish rule in Ukrainian territory west of the Zbruch River, the ZUNR government rejected its policies completely.

In July 1919 Poland occupied most of the territory of the ZUNR and tried to get Entente recognition for its rule in Galicia. Although the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference representing the Entente instructed Poland on 25 June to occupy Ukrainian Galicia temporarily, it recognized Galicia's special status. On 20 November it drafted a treaty with Poland on the autonomy of eastern Galicia under the higher administration of Poland for 25 years, but the Poles rejected that treaty. The Conference of Ambassadors of the great powers of the Entente finally recognized (12 March 1923) the Polish occupation, albeit with the provision that eastern Galicia was to remain autonomous.

Winter campaigns

Winter campaigns. Offensives of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic behind the lines of the Volunteer Army and Red Army in 1919–20 and 1921.

The First Winter Campaign lasted from 6 December 1919 to 6 May 1920. As conventional military action in the Ukrainian-Soviet War, 1917–21, became impossible, the Ukrainian National Republic government decided to demobilize those units unfit for battle and to send its battle-ready troops behind enemy lines to conduct partisan warfare until it could set up a regular front. The participating UNR troops were commanded by Gen Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko. His assistant was Gen Yurii Tiutiunnyk, and his chief of staff was Col Andrii Dolud. Permanent political officers were assigned to the army to maintain liaison among the government, the troops, and the civilian population. Prime Minister Isaak Mazepa kept in touch with the army and even accompanied it for a while. The combat troops consisted of the following groups (renamed divisions in February 1920): Zaporizhia (commanded by Gen Andrii Huly-Hulenko), formed from the remnants of the Zaporozhian Corps; Kyiv (commanded by Gen Tiutiunnyk), formed from the remaining troops of the Sich Riflemen; and Volhynia (commanded by Gen Oleksander Zahrodsky). At first the units operated in the Yelysavethrad region between the Red Army and Anton Denikin's forces. When the Bolshevik-Denikin front moved southward, the Ukrainian units penetrated east behind the Bolshevik lines, and in February 1920 they crossed the Dnieper River into the Zolotonosha region. In April the raiding army fought its way back to the Ukrainian forces on the Polish-Bolshevik front, which it reached finally on 6 May in the vicinity of Yampil.

The participants in the First Winter Campaign marched almost 2,500 km and fought for the following locations: Lypovets, Zhashkiv, Uman, Kaniv, Cherkasy, Smila, Zolotonosha, Olviopil, Holovanivske, Haisyn, Voznesenske (capturing major items from the 14th Soviet Army), Ananiv, and Balta. Estimates of the number of officers and men who took part in the campaign range from 3,000 to 6,000.

The Second Winter Campaign (also known as the Ice Campaign or the November Raid) took place in November 1921, while the Ukrainian National Republic government and its disarmed army were in Poland, and the partisan movement was still active in Ukraine (see Partisan movement in Ukraine, 1918–22). The goal of the raid behind the Bolshevik lines was quite bold: to unify the partisan operations and to sweep the Soviet regime from Ukraine. Detachments of volunteers from the interned soldiers of the UNR Army in Poland formed what was called the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. It was commanded by Gen Yurii Tiutiunnyk, and its chief of staff was Col Yurii Otmarshtain.

The main Volhynia group (800 men) was commanded by Gen Tiutiunnyk, and the Podilian group (400 men), by Lt Col M. Palii and, later, Col S. Chorny. Gen Andrii Huly-Hulenko's Bessarabia group did not undertake any serious operations and after a few days returned from Ukraine to Rumanian territory. The men in all the groups were poorly armed and clothed. The Podilian group set out on 25 October and fought its way through Podilia, where it crushed a Soviet cavalry regiment and transformed itself into a cavalry group. It reached the village of Vakhnivka, 60 km north of Kyiv, and then returned through Volhynia, to cross the Polish border on 29 November. The Volhynia group set out on 4 November and captured Korosten on 7 November but was unable to defend it. The group then moved as far east as the village of Leontivka. Having lost any hope of meeting with the Polisia group and replenishing supplies, it turned west. During the return march it was encircled by Hryhorii Kotovsky's cavalry near the town of Bazar, in the Zhytomyr region. Many of its men were killed in battle at Mali Mynky on 17 November, but the majority (443) were captured: 359 of them were executed at Bazar on 23 November, and the rest (84) were handed over to Bolshevik police. Only 120 men and the staff broke out of the encirclement, and they had fought their way to the Polish border by 20 November. The Second Campaign was the last operation of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic against the Bolshevik forces occupying Ukraine.

Partisan movement in Ukraine, 1918–22

Partisan movement in Ukraine, 1918–22. As government and public order in the Russian Empire dissolved after the February Revolution of 1917, a host of partisan groups sprang up in Ukraine. Differing in size and political orientation, they never formed a unified force behind a single leader or program and often switched their support from one to another of the major contenders for control of Ukraine. Formed mostly from among the Ukrainian peasantry, the movement defended the broad social and political goals of the revolution and sided increasingly with the national aspirations of the Ukrainian people. After the defeat of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic, the partisan movement became the chief opponent of Bolshevik power in Ukraine.

The first partisan groups were formed in 1917 in the Kyiv region to defend the local population from roving bands of soldiers returning from the front. The peasant brigades that arose from some of these groups, such as the Tarashcha, Zvenyhorod, and Uman brigades, took part in resisting the Bolshevik offensive on Kyiv in January–February 1918. Maintaining contact with army units loyal to the Central Rada, these brigades operated in the rear of the Bolshevik forces until April.

During 1918 numerous peasant revolts broke out against the German occupational authorities and the Hetman government in Ukraine. The peasants reacted with violence to forced food requisitions and the return of estates to their former owners. The largest rebellion flared up in the summer in the southern part of Kyiv gubernia (Tarashcha, Zvenyhorod, Skvyra, Uman, and Kaniv counties) and was put down only with the help of a German corps (see Tarashcha uprising). Some partisan operations against the Hetman were instigated by Bolshevik agitators, but they failed to attract wide peasant support. In November–December over 100,000 peasant partisans took part in the overthrow of the Hetman government, which was organized by the Ukrainian National Union.

The partisan movement in Ukraine grew rapidly in 1919. Some partisan units reached sufficient strength to have a decisive influence on the struggle for power among the main protagonists. Nykyfor Hryhoriv's support of the Red Army in February–April was a key factor in its successful offensive against the Whites and the Allies in southern Ukraine. Danylo Zeleny's revolt against the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic impaired its control of the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Poltava regions. Nestor Makhno, who established a brief and uneasy alliance with the Bolsheviks in March, inflicted six months later a harsh defeat on Anton Denikin's army, which forced the Whites to abandon their planned offensive on Moscow and to retreat before the Red Army. At the height of his power Makhno commanded a force of 40,000 men and controlled about a third of Ukraine's present territory.

The Bolshevik occupation of Ukraine met with considerable popular resistance in March–June 1919. Heavy requisition of food destined for Russia, Cheka terror, and the Bolshevik land policy provoked widespread revolts. Later, Bolshevik leaders admitted the extent of partisan opposition: according to Khristian Rakovsky, between 1 April and 15 June there were 328 anti-Bolshevik revolts in Ukraine, and according to Volodymyr Antonov-Ovsiienko, in April and May peasant unrest in Kyiv gubernia, Chernihiv gubernia, Podilia gubernia, and Volhynia gubernia tied down 21,000 Red Army troops. Large anti-Bolshevik detachments were led by otamans, such as Ananii Volynets, I. Romashko, and P. Sokolovsky. Many of the instigators of the peasant unrest were Socialist Revolutionaries (SRS) and members of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' party (Independentists), who wanted an independent socialist Ukrainian republic. In April these parties established in Skvyra the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, the Supreme Insurgent Council, and the Supreme Insurgent Staff to co-ordinate the anti-Bolshevik insurrection. The committee was dissolved in July to allow the Bolsheviks to concentrate their forces against Anton Denikin's offensive. Many of the committee's insurgent groups transferred their support to the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic. A regiment of Nykyfor Hryhoriv's partisans (3,600 men) after his death broke through the Bolshevik front and under Yurii Tiutiunnyk's command formed the Kyiv Group of the UNR Army. In September, Otaman Danylo Zeleny recognized the authority of the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic. At the beginning of the month the UNR government set up in Kamianets-Podilskyi the Central Ukrainian Insurgent Committee to co-ordinate partisan activity. The committee was chaired by Nazar Petrenko and supported by the SRS, the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' party, and the Peasant Association.

In the summer and fall of 1919, as Bolshevik power in Ukraine declined, the partisan movement turned against Anton Denikin's forces, which occupied the territories abandoned by the Bolsheviks. The reactionary social policies of the Whites, their exploitation of the peasants, and their repression of Ukrainian activists provoked spontaneous and uncoordinated mass insurrection. Some of the partisan bands were organized by the Bolsheviks or their sympathizers. The larger and more powerful groups were led by Danylo Zeleny, Andrii Huly-Hulenko, and Nestor Makhno. Partisan activity in his rear undermined Denikin's offensive and enabled the Red Army to score a decisive blow against him at the end of 1919.

The re-established Bolshevik regime was regarded as foreign by most of the population and encountered strong resistance. Generally, the countryside was controlled by partisan bands, and Soviet power remained confined to the towns. During its First Winter Campaign (December 1919–May 1920) the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic tried to unite the various partisan groups in a common uprising against the Bolsheviks. It made contact with Otaman Chuchupaka's forces in Kholodnyi Yar, Otaman Zabolotny's detachments at Balta, and the larger, well-disciplined units of Andrii Huly-Hulenko in the Yelysavethrad region. There were many other sizable bands besides these, including A. Bondarenko's in the Zvenyhorodka region, Kuzmenko-Tytarenko's around Tarashcha, Fotii Meleshko's around Yelysavethrad, and I. Sokil's near Cherkasy. In the summer of 1920 the Cheka chief F. Dzerzhinsky was sent from Moscow with 6,000 special Cheka troops to deal with the partisan problem. In Kyiv gubernia there were 11 peasant revolts in June, 51 in July, and 106 in August, and in Poltava gubernia there were 76, 99, and 98, respectively. Vladimir Lenin admitted as late as October 1920 that Soviet control of Ukraine was formal rather than real.

At the beginning of 1921 there were about 40,000 partisans in Ukraine. The largest force was Nestor Makhno's in southern Ukraine, but several bands numbered 500 or more men: those under Struk, Sirko, and Yakiv Mordalevych (in Kyiv gubernia), Loshyn (Chernihiv gubernia), Yurii Tiutiunnyk (Volhynia gubernia), Holub (Podilia), Shuba (Poltava gubernia), and Burlaka and Siroshapka (Kharkiv gubernia). In March 1921 the Bolshevik regime offered amnesty to insurgents who surrendered voluntarily. By September 1922, 200 otamans and 10,000 men had surrendered. With the suspension of Soviet-Polish hostilities and the defeat of Petr Wrangel's army, the Bolsheviks redirected their forces in early 1921 against the partisan movement. Using Mikhail Frunze's tactics of ruthless executions, they launched a wide clearing campaign. In 87 operations during April and May they reportedly killed 5,000 and captured 4,200 partisans, and destroyed 28 bands. In June they eliminated the All-Ukrainian Insurgent Committee headed by Bondarenko in the Bratslav region and the Ukrainian Central Insurgent Committee headed by Ivan Andrukh in Kyiv. By the end of the summer the main partisan groups were crushed, although small, sporadic revolts continued to break out. The Ukrainian National Republic government's last attempt to spark a general insurrection against the Bolshevik regime—the Second Winter Campaign, led by Yurii Tiutiunnyk in October and November 1921—ended tragically, with the execution of 359 soldiers at Bazar.

The partisan movement in Ukraine demonstrated the deep hostility of the Ukrainian peasantry to any foreign invader and particularly to the Bolshevik regime. It also made the Soviet rulers permanently suspicious about Ukraine's loyalty.

Symon Petliura

Petliura, Symon [Petljura] (pseuds: V. Marchenko, V. Salevsky, I. Rokytny, S. Prosvitianyn, O. Riast), b 10 May 1879 in Poltava, d 25 May 1926 in Paris. (Photo: Symon Petliura.) Statesman and publicist; supreme commander of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic and president of the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic. He entered the Poltava Theological Seminary in 1895 but was expelled in 1901 for belonging to a clandestine Ukrainian hromada (see Hromadas), which he had joined in 1898. From 1900 he was also active in a political cell in Poltava that became the nucleus of the Revolutionary Ukrainian party (RUP). To avoid arrest he moved in the autumn of 1902 to Katerynodar, in the Kuban, where he worked as a teacher and then, under the supervision of Fedir Shcherbyna, cataloged the archives of the Kuban Cossack Army. For his involvement in Katerynodar in the local RUP branch (the Black Sea Free Hromada) and in RUP periodicals (notably Dobra novyna) published in Austrian-ruled Lviv, he was arrested in December 1903. After being released on bail in March 1904, he went to Kyiv and from there, in the autumn, to Lviv to do RUP work and to edit its monthly Selianyn. . In 1905, after the general amnesty, he returned to Kyiv. In January 1906 he left for Saint Petersburg to edit, with Prokip Poniatenko and Mykola Porsh, the social democratic monthly Vil’na Ukraina (-17937L-->Saint Petersburg). After returning to Kyiv in July 1906, he worked as secretary of the newspaper Rada (Kyiv), coedited (in 1907–8) Slovo (-14562L-->Kyiv), the organ of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' party, and contributed to the monthly Ukraina (-16770L-->1907). In 1909 he moved to Moscow and worked there as a bookkeeper until 1912, when he became coeditor, with Oleksander Salikovsky, of the Russian-language monthly Ukrainskaia zhizn’ (1912–17). In 1916 and until the beginning of 1917 he was deputy plenipotentiary of the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos aid committee on the Russian western front.

After the February Revolution of 1917 Petliura was elected head of the Ukrainian Military Committee of the Western Front. He was sent as a delegate to the First All-Ukrainian Military Congress (18–21 May 1917; see All-Ukrainian military congresses) in Kyiv, where he was elected chairman of the Ukrainian General Military Committee. In June 1917 he was appointed general secretary of military affairs in the first General Secretariat of the Central Rada, and directed all his energies to organizing and building up the Ukrainian armed forces, while facing opposition from certain members of the Central Rada as well as open and active hostility from Russian circles. In late 1917, disagreeing with the policies of Volodymyr Vynnychenko, the chairman of the General Secretariat, Petliura resigned and went to Left-Bank Ukraine. There he organized and commanded the Haidamaka Battalion of Slobidska Ukraine, a military formation that played a decisive role in the January–February 1918 battles for Kyiv and suppression of the Arsenal uprising there.

After Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky's coup in April 1918, Petliura headed the Kyiv Gubernial Zemstvo and All-Ukrainian Union of Zemstvos. He was arrested by the Hetman government in July 1918 but was released after four months, and went to Bila Tserkva. There he took part in the popular uprising against Skoropadsky's regime and was then elected a member of the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic and supreme otaman of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic. On 11 February 1919, after the army's retreat from Kyiv and Volodymyr Vynnychenko's flight abroad, Petliura succeeded him as president of the Directory and resigned from the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' party. In the difficult conditions of the next 10 months he commanded the UNR army and later joint UNR Army and Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA) against the Red Army and Volunteer Army (see Ukrainian-Soviet War, 1917–21). On 5 December 1919, surrounded by the enemy and faced with certain defeat after the UHA established a separate alliance with the Volunteer Army, Petliura and some members of his government fled Ukraine and made for Warsaw in the hope of finding support and allies there. In the meantime Petliura ordered the UNR Army to begin the First Winter Campaign.

After the signing of the Treaty of Warsaw in April 1920, the UNR army under Petliura's command and its Polish military ally mounted an offensive against the Bolshevik occupation in Ukraine. The joint forces took Kyiv on 7 May 1920 but were forced to retreat in June. Thereafter Petliura continued the war against the Bolsheviks without Polish involvement. Poland and Soviet Russia concluded an armistice in October 1920, and in November the major UNR army formations were forced to retreat across the Zbruch River into Polish-held territory and to submit to internment (see Internment camps). Petliura and his government resided temporarily in Tarnow. Later Petliura moved to Warsaw under an assumed name. In late 1923, faced with increased Soviet demands that Poland hand him over, he was forced to leave for Budapest. From there he went to Vienna and Geneva, and in late 1924 he settled in Paris. There he founded the weekly Tryzub and oversaw the activities of the Government-in-exile of the Ukrainian National Republic until his assassination by a Bessarabian Jew (Shalom Schwartzbard) claiming vengeance for Petliura's purported responsibility for the pogroms in Ukraine (see Schwartzbard Trial). He was buried in Montparnasse Cemetery.

Petliura debuted as a publicist in 1902 in Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk. There and in the periodicals he edited he published many articles on political, civic, and cultural affairs, particularly on the question of Ukraine's national liberation. His articles had a discernible impact on the formation of Ukrainian national consciousness before the Revolution of 1917. As an emigre in Poland Petliura wrote a brochure on contemporary Ukrainian emigres and their responsibility (1923). In Tryzub he wrote mainly about the 1917–21 attempts at Ukrainian nation building, the responsibility of emigres, and Ukraine under Bolshevik rule.

The entire 1917–21 period of struggle for Ukrainian statehood is indissolubly linked with Petliura. As a publicist, politician, and military leader he was uncompromising on the issue of Ukrainian independence. Petliura's broad outlook was particularly evident in his definition of the tasks of Ukrainian emigres and their role in the struggle for Ukrainian statehood. Despite the initially negative, if not openly hostile, attitudes of certain emigre (particularly Western Ukrainian) circles to Petliura because of his central role in the Treaty of Warsaw and the Ukrainian-Polish alliance, since the mid-1920s he has personified, perhaps more than any other person, the Struggle for Independence (1917–20). The personification seemingly also extends to the issue of the pogroms that took place in Ukraine during the revolutionary period of 1918–20, and Petliura has frequently been invested with the responsibility for those acts. Petliura's own personal convictions render such responsibility highly unlikely, and all the documentary evidence indicates that he consistently made efforts to stem pogrom activity by UNR troops. The Russian and Soviet authorities also made Petliura a symbol of Ukrainian efforts at independence, although in their rendition he was a traitor to the Ukrainian people, and his followers (Petliurites) were unprincipled opportunists.

Army of the Ukrainian National Republic

Army of the Ukrainian National Republic. The armed forces of Ukraine during the struggle for independence (1917–20). Unlike the Ukrainian Galician Army, the regular armed forces of the Western Ukrainian National Republic, the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic was never a regular, well-structured organization, but was made up of various armed volunteer units. The history of the UNR Army can be divided into three main phases: the periods of the Central Rada, the Hetman government, and the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic, although the formation of its units in all phases was to a large degree spontaneous and chaotic.

During the Central Rada period the UNR Army was formed in three ways: (1) by spontaneous detachment of Ukrainian units from the Russian army, forming, on the western front, the Haidamaka Cavalry Regiment; in Moscow, three Shevchenko regiments; in Symferopil and Chernihiv, the Doroshenko regiments; in Kyiv, the Polubotok Regiment, the Khmelnytsky Regiment (Bohdanivtsi), and other smaller units; (2) through Ukrainianization of Russian army units (at first without, but later with, the consent of the Russian army command); (3) through the reorganization of former army units (eg, the Sich Riflemen company was formed out of Austrian prisoners of war in Russia) or the creation of new units out of various army personnel (eg, the Bluecoats were formed out of Ukrainian prisoners of war in German camps and the Graycoats were formed out of Ukrainian prisoners of war in Austrian camps).

The formation of Ukrainian units in the Russian army was part of the process of general disintegration of the multinational Russian army along national lines that had begun at the front and in the rear immediately after the February Revolution of 1917. Soviets of soldiers' deputies were elected by separate units. In units with a significant number of Ukrainian soldiers, separate Ukrainian soldiers' soviets were formed in parallel with the general soviets (in the rear they were called also soldiers' clubs, assemblies, and committees). Apart from the spontaneous national awakening, an important role in the formation of Ukrainian units was played by the Ukrainian Military Club (formed in Kyiv on 22 February on the initiative of Lt Mykola Mikhnovsky), which formed the Ukrainian Military Organizing Committee, whose task was to organize Ukrainian volunteer units. The appeals of the committee were very successful and stimulated the first manifestation of Ukrainian military strength during the All-Ukrainian military congresses in Kyiv (the first on 18–21 May 1917, the second on 18–23 June, the third on 2–12 November), which supported the Central Rada unconditionally, called for the separation of Ukrainian units from the Russian army and elected the first military leadership—the Ukrainian Military Committee.

Instances of spontaneous Ukrainianization on the front became widespread (on the northern front, the 21st Corps; on the Romanian front, the 10th and 11th corps; on the western front, part of the 9th Corps). In units that were nationally mixed, the Ukrainian soldiers formed their own subunits, in which both discipline and fighting ability were superior and resistance to the Bolshevik appeals for demobilization was stronger than in other subunits. Because of this and the demands of the representatives of the organizing committee, the Russian commander in chief, Gen A. Brusilov, agreed to the official Ukrainianization of some units: the two-division 34th Russian Corps under the command of Gen Pavlo Skoropadsky (renamed the 1st Ukrainian) and the 6th Russian Corps (renamed the 2nd Sich Zaporozhian Corps) under the command of Gen Mandryka. Of 4 million Ukrainians in the Russian army in 1917, only 1.5 million were Ukrainianized, and the majority of these declared themselves neutral when it came to fighting the Bolsheviks or demobilized under the influence of Bolshevik agitation.

The Central Rada itself had no clear plans concerning military organization and did not recognize the need for a standing army based on compulsory military service. Instead, the concept of Free Cossacks, a volunteer, territorial, national militia, won out and was ratified by the Rada on 13 November 1917. As a result, on the eve of the Bolshevik invasion, the Central Rada announced the demobilization of the regular army (16 January 1918). Instead of building a standing army the government began recruitment for the national militia, for which uniforms and insignia were already designed. The Ukrainian-Bolshevik war (see Ukrainian-Soviet War, 1917–21) convinced the Central Rada that Ukraine needed a regular standing army. A recruitment plan was worked out for an army that was to be made up of eight infantry corps and four cavalry divisions. Before these plans could be realized the Central Rada was overthrown by the Germans and replaced by the Hetman government. Before the downfall of the Central Rada, the UNR Army consisted of the Zaporozhian Corps (four infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, and two light-artillery detachments), the Sich Riflemen Regiment, the Bluecoats, the Graycoats (in the process of formation), plus an indeterminate number of Free Cossacks, for a total of approximately 15,000 soldiers.

After the First All-Ukrainian Military Congress, the command of the UNR Army was taken over by the Ukrainian General Military Committee, headed by Symon Petliura. After the proclamation of the Ukrainian National Republic on 20 November 1917, a General Secretariat of Military Affairs was formed (general secretary, Petliura; chief of the general staff, Oleksander Hrekov). After the proclamation of the independence of Ukraine on 22 January 1918 the Ministry of Military Affairs of the Ukrainian National Republic was formed (Mykola Porsh, A. Nemolovsky, and Col Oleksander Zhukovsky were ministers) and, under its auspices, the Military General Staff was created (headed by Gen Hrekov, Gen B. Bobrovsky, and Col Oleksander Slyvynsky). At first the general staff had several departments (organization, liaison, supplies, training, and artillery), whose number was reduced to only two—the organizational department and the quartermaster's department—after a reorganization by Col Slyvynsky.

During the period of the Central Rada the UNR Army was in a constant state of organization. Units that were formed at the front continued to serve there until the armistice, leaving the defense of Kyiv and the government mainly to the units of the Kyiv garrison (the Haidamaka Battalion of Slobidska Ukraine, commanded by Otaman Symon Petliura, the Galician Battalion of the Sich Riflemen, 16 small battalions of Free Cossacks under Mykhailo Kovenko, and the auxiliary student battalion of the Sich Riflemen under Capt Ahapii Honcharenko, which was routed in the Battle of Kruty). Such a weak force could not hold Kyiv, and the Bolsheviks occupied the city on 8 February 1918. Only at the end of the month, after the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the signing of the armistice with the Central Powers, were the Ukrainian forces, under Gen K. Prisovsky and Otaman Petliura and with the help of the Austro-Hungarian and German armies, able to repel the Bolsheviks. In addition to the battles for Kyiv, the Ukrainian forces (the Zaporozhian Corps under Gen Oleksander Natiiv and the detachments of Otaman Petro Bolbochan and Otaman Volodymyr Sikevych) occupied the Crimea and the Don region. But the Germans forced the Ukrainian army to leave the Crimea because it was not part of the Ukrainian National Republic and, on the eve of the establishment of the Hetman government, reduced the UNR Army to the Zaporozhian Corps after disarming the Bluecoats and the Sich Riflemen Regiment.

The Hetman government. Although the government and even the name of the country were changed (to the Ukrainian State), plans for establishing a regular army continued to be pursued. On 24 July 1918 the Council of Ministers passed a law establishing compulsory military service and ratified plans for the organization of the army (formerly proposed under the Central Rada), military courts, and medical services and supplies. In peacetime the army was to consist of 310,000 military personnel in eight territorial corps, with a budget of 1,254 million karbovantsi annually. A uniform was not established for the Ukrainian army, but military ranks and insignia were to be based on the German model, and the trident was ratified as the insignia for the cap (it remained so after the fall of the hetman). On 16 October 1918 by proclamation of the hetman, the Cossack organizational system, based on territorial units (several regiments in each unit) and otaman commanders under the hetman, was revived. The Cossacks were to be governed by the Great Cossack Council (with 32 members, some of whom were elected and others appointed). Although the otaman commanders were appointed, the Cossack system could not be put into effect before the November uprising against the hetman.

Apart from the units that remained from the period of the Central Rada (the Zaporozhian Corps, renamed the Zaporozhian Division; the Zaporozhian and the Black Sea garrisons), some units were formed during the Hetman government: the Serdiuk Guard Division (in July 1918, 5,000 men) (see Serdiuk guard divisions), the Graycoats (begun in Austria under the Central Rada), the Sich Riflemen unit (revived as a separate detachment of the Sich Riflemen at the end of August 1918). In the autumn of 1918 commissioned and non-commissioned officer corps and cavalry divisions were formed. In October 1918 the Special Corps was formed of Russian officers, and in the larger cities Russian volunteer-officer companies were formed as part of the Ukrainian army. The armed forces were acquiring a Russian character through the ‘National Guard’ (Derzhavna Varta), whose composition made it a continuation of the tsarist police, and the district special companies, which had been used for punitive expeditions. In November 1918 the Army of the Ukrainian State numbered 60,000 and was under the authority of the War Ministry. Gen Aleksandr Rogoza, a Russian, was appointed minister by the hetman; Col Kakurin was appointed chief of the general staff; Gen Drozdovsky and Gen Prokhorovych were appointed chief quartermasters.

Although Ukraine was not at war between July and October 1918, the Hetman government took an active interest in the army. However, the Army of the Ukrainian State did not develop beyond the organizational phase, although it did receive a good organizational foundation. Its development was hindered by the officers who were often indifferent or hostile to the Ukrainian movement (to become an officer one had to have a record of active service before the war and many who did were Russians) and by the German high command, which feared a sizable Ukrainian armed force. The situation improved slightly as a result of the personal visit of the hetman to the kaiser Wilhelm II in Berlin, but the continuing revolts of the populace against the oppression of the Hetman government and the arbitrariness of the Russian Whites, tolerated by the hetman, forced him to appoint as chief commander of the armed forces Gen Fedor Keller, who, on 11 November, abrogated all Ukrainian army regulations and replaced them with Russian ones. Only the November uprising against the hetman, organized by the Ukrainian National Union (which later designated the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic) saved the UNR Army from Russification and the Ukrainian state from absorption into the Russian anti-Bolshevik movement.

The period of the Directory. Although many independent insurgent units (eg, the Dnipro Division, which fell apart after the occupation of Kyiv, and the Black Sea Division, which was crushed in battle by the Bolsheviks) took part in the uprising against Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, the main part of the UNR Army was at first made up of those units that crossed from the hetman's side to the Directory: the Zaporozhian Division, the Graycoats, and the Sich Riflemen Regiment, which expanded into a two-division corps incorporating the Serdiuk guard divisions and other units and was renamed the Siege Corps of Sich Riflemen. Later, on the orders of the Directory, other units were formed: the Volhynia Division (composed of the hetman's Nalyvaiko Regiment, the Galician Regiment, the Czech-Ukrainian Regiment, and others) and the Podilia Division (made up of various revolutionary groups that were active in Podilia—the Karmeliuk, Zalizniak, Blackhoods [Chornoslychnyky] and other regiments). In December 1918 the General Council (Heneralna Bulava) of the Ministry of War organized the UNR Army into four groups, in accordance with the demands of the front: Left Bank (under Otaman Petro Bolbochan, in charge of the Bolshevik front), North Right Bank (under Otaman Volodymyr Oskilko, in charge of the Bolshevik-Polish front), Southern (under Gen Oleksander Hrekov, in charge of the front against the Entente), and Dniester (on the Romanian front). In February 1919 the Southern and Dniester groups were disbanded, and their units transferred to the Bolshevik front.

Apart from the regular units there were also partisan detachments, commanded by politically inexperienced officers lacking any national consciousness. They willingly rose up against Pavlo Skoropadsky, but in battles with the Bolsheviks succumbed to their propaganda, declared themselves neutral, and often, in critical moments, would cross over to the Bolshevik side (Nestor Makhno, Nykyfor Hryhoriv, and Danylo Zeleny; see Partisan movement in Ukraine, 1918–22). After the retreat to the Right Bank (spring 1919), the UNR Army was again reorganized: small units were amalgamated into 11 divisions (each consisting of three infantry, one artillery, and one cavalry regiment) and divided into five independent detachments: the Sich Riflemen (three divisions) under Col Yevhen Konovalets, the Zaporozhian Group (three divisions) under Col Volodymyr Salsky, the Volhynia Group (two divisions) under Col Vsevolod Petriv, a division under Col Oleksander Udovychenko, and two divisions under Otaman Vasyl Tiutiunnyk.

In mid-July 1919 the Ukrainian Galician Army crossed the Zbruch River and, although it continued to exist as a separate unit under its own command, co-ordinated its actions with the UNR Army under a common operational command—the supreme otaman's staff. At this time the armed forces of the Ukrainian state consisted of three Galician corps (50,000 men) and five formations of the UNR Army (30,000 men). The total fighting strength of the united armies, together with the partisan detachments (Nestor Makhno in the Katerynoslav region, Anhel in the Chernihiv region, Danylo Zeleny in the south, Ya. Shepel in the Lityn region, Nykyfor Hryhoriv in the Kherson region, and others), was about 100,000 personnel (including 35,000 combat troops), 335 cannons, 1,100 machine guns, two air regiments, and armored trains and motor vehicles.

UNR Army command. With the establishment of the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic, military affairs were taken over by Symon Petliura. He was designated supreme otaman (commander in chief) and under his authority were put the Ministry of War (headed, in turn, by the generals Oleksander Hrekov, Vsevolod Petriv, and Volodymyr Salsky) and the acting otaman (Gen Oleksander Osetsky), who directed army operations and the general staff. The general staff was again reorganized into a two-quartermaster system (an operational section under Gen Drozdovsky and an organizational section under Gen Kakurin), with appropriate departments (operations, intelligence, foreign relations, etc). After the retreat from Kyiv the command of the UNR Army was assumed by the staff of the acting army, which consulted with Petliura only on crucial decisions. The staff of the acting army was headed by Otaman Andrii Melnyk, with Vasyl Tiutiunnyk as second in command. Gen Volodymyr Sinkler was chief quartermaster, Col Mykola Kapustiansky was operations chief, and Col Mykola Chebotariv was chief of intelligence. After the operational union of the two armies (Ukrainian Galician Army and UNR Army), a supreme otaman's staff was created. It was made up of personnel from both armies (Gen Mykola Yunakiv was chief of staff, Gen Viktor Kurmanovych was chief quartermaster, Lt Col K. Dolezhal was in charge of operations, and Lt Col Hrytsiv was in charge of intelligence).

From the First Winter Campaign to the end of the war for independence, the command of the UNR Army consisted of Gen Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko, commander in chief; Col Petro Lypko, chief of staff; and Gen Viktor Kushch, chief quartermaster. The Ministry of War was headed by Gen Oleksa Halkyn and then Col V. Salsky. The restored general staff was headed by Gen V. Sinkler, and Gen M. Yunakiv was head of the Supreme Military Council of the Ukrainian National Republic.

From December 1918 to the fall of the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic warfare continued uninterruptedly. The front shifted, and at the same time units were re-formed and renamed. After a difficult retreat in the fall of 1919, the UNR Army found itself near Chortoryia in Volhynia, surrounded by Polish troops, by the Bolsheviks, and by Anton Denikin's army, without any possibility of maintaining a regular front. It was forced to resort to guerrilla warfare, and on 6 December 1919 the UNR Army set out on the First Winter Campaign. In this campaign the following divisions took part: Zaporozhian Division, Volhynian Division, Kyiv Division (Peasant), and some detachments of the Sich Riflemen. In May 1920, 2,680 men returned from the campaign, and they took part in the continuing Ukrainian-Soviet War. In January 1920 the Sixth Sich Division of the Army of the UNR, under Col Marko Bezruchko, and the revived Third Iron Rifle Division of the Army of the UNR, under Col Oleksander Udovychenko, were formed from Ukrainian prisoners of war interned in Poland. They were attached to the 3rd and 6th Polish armies, remaining there through the Polish-Ukrainian campaign against the Bolsheviks. At the beginning of the joint Polish-Ukrainian effort, the UNR Army was composed of the following divisions: the Zaporozhian Division, Volhynian Division, Third Iron Rifle Division, Kyiv Division, Kherson Division, and Sich Division (each made up of three infantry brigades with artillery, one cavalry regiment, and one technical regiment); there was also a separate cavalry division (see Separate Cavalry Division of the Army of the UNR). At the end of the Polish-Ukrainian war in October 1920, the UNR Army had 23,000 men. After the Polish-Bolshevik armistice the staff of the UNR Army prepared an anti-Bolshevik offensive, but the Red Army began its own offensive, and after intense battles (11–12 November 1920) the Ukrainian army retreated westward. On 21 November the UNR Army crossed the Zbruch River and was interned by the Polish authorities.

The war in Ukraine continued, fought by guerrilla detachments under the Revolutionary staff, headed by Gen Yurii Tiutiunnyk. At the beginning of November 1921 the Revolutionary staff ordered a partisan raid on the Right Bank (the so-called Second Winter Campaign) to be carried out by two groups—a Podilian unit and a Volhynian unit, made up of 1,500 volunteers from among the interned soldiers of the UNR Army. The Bolsheviks routed both groups. The Volhynian unit was surrounded and defeated near Bazar; 359 soldiers were executed (23 November 1921).

After a lengthy and difficult confinement in internment camps in Poland (Wadowice, Piotrkow Trybunalski, Tuchola, Aleksandrow Kujawski, Lancut, Strzalkow, Kalisz, Szczepiorno), the interned soldiers of the UNR Army were granted the status of emigres. The staff of the UNR Army continued to exist as an institution subordinate to the Government-in-exile of the Ukrainian National Republic. The military traditions of the UNR Army were preserved by various Ukrainian veterans' organizations, the most active of which was the Society of Former Combatants of the Ukrainian Republican Democratic Army in France (est 1927).

General characteristics of the UNR Army. Having been formed basically by Russian army personnel, the UNR Army followed Russian organizational and tactical models. Because of the frequent changes of the front, regimes, and military commands, because of the anarchy created by guerrilla detachments, and because of German and Austrian opposition, the UNR Army was never able to complete its organization through conscription or general mobilization and hence remained essentially an army of volunteers. The army had no durable home front and hence no permanent base from which to draw human and material resources. Organization, training, uniforms, arms—all the elements of a normal army—were in the process of organization and subject to the vicissitudes of the Ukrainian struggle for independence (1917–1920).

Ukrainian-Soviet War, 1917–21

Ukrainian-Soviet War, 1917–21. A military struggle for control of Ukraine waged intermittently in 1917–21 by Ukrainian independentist forces and pro-Bolshevik elements seeking to establish Soviet rule. The struggle began shortly after the October Revolution of 1917. Notwithstanding the creation of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) on 20 November 1917, the Bolsheviks planned to seize power in Ukraine with the aid of Russian or Russified urban elements, Russian garrisons, and army units stationed near the front. Their armed uprising in Kyiv on 11 December 1917 was unsuccessful, however, and the Bolshevized army units were deported from Ukraine in stages. A pro-Bolshevik force under Yevheniia Bosh moving in on Kyiv was also disarmed by Ukrainian troops under Pavlo Skoropadsky near Zhmerynka and then sent off to Russia.

December 1917 to April 1918. Hostilities broke out in Ukraine after a series of diplomatic maneuvers. On 17 December 1917 the Petrograd-based Council of People's Commissars issued an ultimatum demanding that Bolshevik troops be granted the legal right to be stationed on Ukrainian soil. The ultimatum was rejected by the UNR. The Bolsheviks countered by proclaiming their own Ukrainian government based in Kharkiv on 25 December, and then proceeded with a campaign to establish effective military control over Ukraine. The Ukrainian forces at that time consisted of a small volunteer detachment and several battalions of the Free Cossacks. The pro-Soviet forces in Ukraine included Russian army regulars stationed at the front, a number of garrisoned units, and Red Guard detachments composed of laborers from Kharkiv gubernia and the Donbas. Their main strength, however, lay in a large force of Red Guards from Russia, which had been stationed along the Ukrainian border. On 25 December that 30,000-strong army, led by Volodymyr Antonov-Ovsiienko, set off in four groups from Homel and Briansk toward Chernihiv–Bakhmach, Hlukhiv–Konotip, and Kharkiv–Poltava–Lozova.

The invasion by pro-Soviet forces was accompanied by uprisings initiated by local Bolshevik agitators in cities throughout Left-Bank Ukraine. The Bolshevik forces occupied Kharkiv (26 December), Lozova and Katerynoslav (now Dnipropetrovske, 9 January 1918), Oleksandrivske (now Zaporizhia, 15 January), and Poltava (20 January). The Briansk group captured Konotip (16 January) and Hlukhiv (19 January). On 27 January the Bolshevik army groups converged on Bakhmach and then set off under the command of Mikhail Muravev to take Kyiv.

The Central Rada prepared for the defense of the capital by sending advance forces of volunteers to Poltava and Bakhmach. One of those, the Student Battalion, was annihilated by a vastly larger (4,000 troops) Bolshevik force at the Battle of Kruty, 130 km northeast of Kyiv, on 29 January. As the Soviet advance continued, an attempt was made to take Kyiv through an uprising organized by non-Ukrainian workers based at the Arsenal plant. Fighting broke out on 29 January and continued until 4 February, when the revolt was put down by a newly formed contingent of the Sich Riflemen and the Free Cossacks. Meanwhile the Bolshevik expeditionary force continued to move on the capital from Bakhmach and Lubni. On 8 February the Ukrainian government was forced to evacuate the city. Soviet troops under Mikhail Muravev's command entered Kyiv on 9 February and then carried out brutal reprisals against the Ukrainian civilian population.

After taking Kyiv the Bolsheviks launched an offensive in Right-Bank Ukraine, where they were engaged in battle mainly with Free Cossack forces. They moved into Volhynia (led by the former Russian Seventh Army), where they took Proskuriv (now Khmelnytskyi), Zhmerynka, Koziatyn, Berdychiv, Rivne, and Shepetivka and forced the Ukrainians back to a Zhytomyr–Korosten–Sarny defensive line.

The tide changed following Ukraine's signature of the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the entry of German and Austrian troops into the conflict in late February as allies of the Central Rada. With a Ukrainian command of Gen K. Prisovsky and Symon Petliura the combined force rolled the Bolshevik troops out of Right-Bank Ukraine's centers, such as Zhytomyr, Berdychiv, Koziatyn, and Bucha, before regaining Kyiv on 1 March. Through March and April the German and Austrian armies took control of Left-Bank Ukraine, and the troops of Petro Bolbochan and Volodymyr Sikevych took the Crimea and the Donets Basin. Alarmed by the changed military situation, Vladimir Lenin ordered his representative in Ukraine, Grigorii Ordzhonikidze, to Ukrainize (at least ostensibly) the predominantly Russian forces of Volodymyr Antonov-Ovsiienko and Mikhail Muravev in a bid for more popular support. The maneuver proved unsuccessful. Continuing military setbacks gave Soviet Russia little choice but to comply with the articles of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and to sign a preliminary peace with the Ukrainian government on 12 June 1918.

December 1918 to December 1919. The second phase of the Ukrainian-Soviet War began with the fall of the German-supported Hetman government to the forces of the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic. The Bolsheviks took advantage of the unsettled situation by forming a Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine on 20 November 1918 and starting a military advance into Ukraine in December with an army led by Volodymyr Antonov-Ovsiienko, Joseph Stalin, and Volodymyr Zatonsky. The Directory protested the aggression, with diplomatic notes sent to the Soviet government on 31 December 1918 and on 3, 4, and 9 January 1919. Not having received a reply, the Directory was compelled to declare war against Russia on 16 January. The Ukrainian forces at that time consisted of two regular troop formations, the Zaporozhian Corps and the Sich Riflemen, as well as partisan detachments (see Partisan movement in Ukraine, 1918–22) led by otamans, such as Nestor Makhno, Nykyfor Hryhoriv, and Danylo Zeleny. The otamans, however, were politically unreliable and occasionally sided with the Bolsheviks.

In December 1918 and January 1919 the Bolshevik expeditionary force, aided by some of the otamans, captured Left-Bank Ukraine, and on 5 February it closed in on Kyiv, where it forced the Ukrainian government once more to flee from the capital. The Soviet attack proceeded on several fronts. A northern group moved along a Mozyr–Korosten and Lunynets–Sarny–Rivne line in an attempt to cut off the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic from the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA) to the west. A southern group proceeded from the Kremenchuk-Katerynoslav region through Znamianka toward the Birzula–Koziatyn–Zhmerynka line in an effort to cut off the UNR troops from possible reinforcement by Entente forces. At a critical moment Otaman Nykyfor Hryhoriv threw his support behind them. The third Bolshevik army group proceeded from Kyiv to the Berdychiv–Koziatyn–Zhmerynka line in an effort to keep the northern and southern wings of the UNR Army divided.

The UNR army launched a counteroffensive in March, in which it defeated the Soviet forces along the Berdychiv–Koziatyn line and advanced almost to Kyiv, thereby effectively cutting off any possibility that the Soviets might march through Romania to Hungary in order to aid the Bela Kun regime. The Bolshevik forces retaliated in April (after the withdrawal of Entente troops) by marching on Zhmerynka and dividing the UNR army's southern flank from the force's main body. The southern group subsequently lost the support of Otaman Omelian Volokh and was forced to retreat into Romania, where it was disarmed (eventually returning through Galicia to Volhynia). At the same time, the UNR army was pushed back to a small parcel of territory approx 40–50 km wide in the Dubno-Brody region of southwestern Volhynia. Its position was weakened further with a coup attempt by one of its commanding officers, Volodymyr Oskilko.

The UNR Army's fortunes improved as Ukrainian peasants, disgruntled by the Bolsheviks' anti-Ukrainian policy and high requisition quotas, started to replenish insurgent ranks. But before the army itself could regroup, it faced an assault by Polish forces in the Lutsk region and advances from the Red Army in the north and southeast that took Rivne, Shepetivka, Proskuriv, and even Kamianets-Podilskyi. The UNR then reached a peace agreement with the Poles and reorganized its army into four groups—the Sich Riflemen and the Zaporozhian Corps, Volhynian Corps, and Southwestern Corps—with a total of approx 15,000 soldiers. In early June the UNR forces launched an offensive which retook Podilia and Kamianets-Podilskyi. The Red Army retaliated at the end of the month with a campaign that regained Proskuriv (5 July) and approached Kamianets-Podilskyi, which had been made the UNR's provisional capital. The UNR was then strengthened by the arrival of Yurii Tiutiunnyk with troops formerly under Nykyfor Hryhoriv, who had worked his way through the Reds' southern flank. The UNR Army launched a campaign which pushed the Bolshevik forces back to the Horodok [see Horodok (Khmelnytskyi oblast)]–Yarmolyntsi–Sharhorod–Dunaivtsi–Nova Ushytsia–Vapniarka line before being joined by UHA troops who had crossed the Zbruch River on 16–17 July; their arrival brought together a combined Ukrainian force of nearly 85,000 regulars and 15,000 partisans.

The subsequent campaign to take Kyiv proceeded with victories in Vinnytsia (12 August), Khmilnyk, Yaniv, Kalynivka, and Starokostiantyniv (14 August), Berdychiv (19 August), and Zhytomyr (21 August). On 31 August the Ukrainian troops entered Kyiv, only to discover that soldiers from Anton Denikin's Volunteer Army had arrived at the same time. Hostilities between the two forces were narrowly averted when the combined Ukrainian forces pulled out of the city. The Bolsheviks took advantage of the Ukrainians' standoff with Denikin's troops to move some of their forces from the Katerynoslav region to Zhytomyr. Meanwhile the leadership of the UNR and UHA split over how to deal with Denikin, a situation exacerbated by an outbreak of typhus among the troops. The UHA leadership finally made a separate peace with the Volunteer Army on 6 November. The military situation had worsened as Bolshevik forces, which had made substantial gains in Right-Bank Ukraine's areas formerly controlled by Denikin's troops, and the Poles moved into the western reaches of Ukraine. By the end of November the government and the UNR Army found themselves hemmed in by Soviet, Polish, and Volunteer Army troops. At a conference on 4 December the army decided to suspend regular military operations in favor of underground partisan warfare.

December 1919 to November 1920. The UNR Army under the command of Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko carried out an underground operation known as the First Winter Campaign in the Yelysavethrad (now Kirovohrad) region against the Soviet 14th Army from 6 December 1919 to 6 May 1920. In addition to that action the UNR government concluded the Treaty of Warsaw on 22 April, and then launched a joint offensive with Polish troops against the Bolsheviks. By 7 May a Ukrainian division under the command of Marko Bezruchko entered Kyiv, but the success was short-lived. A Red Army counteroffensive led by Semen Budenny pushed the combined forces back across the Zbruch River and past Zamosc toward Warsaw. After the decisive battle of 15 September the Polish-Ukrainian forces threw the Bolshevik contingent back as far as the Sharhorod–Bar–Lityn line in Podilia. The Poles concluded a separate peace with the Soviets on 18 October. The 23,000-strong UNR force continued fighting until 21 October, when its position became untenable. The UNR Army crossed the Zbruch River into Polish-controlled Galicia, where they were disarmed and placed in internment camps.

November 1921. The final military action of the UNR against the Soviets was a raid in November 1921 known as the Second Winter Campaign. The intent of the action was to provide a catalyst for the formation of partisan groups which would incite a general uprising against the Bolsheviks in Ukraine. The commander of the action was Yurii Tiutiunnyk. Two expeditionary forces were established, Podilia (400 men) and Volhynia (800 men). The Podilia group advanced as far as the village of Vakhnivka, in the Kyiv region, before returning to Polish territory through Volhynia on 29 November. The Volhynia group took Korosten and advanced as far as the village of Leonivka in the Kyiv region. On its return march it was intercepted by a Bolshevik cavalry force under the command of Hryhorii Kotovsky, however, and routed in battle near Mali Mynky on 17 November. Of the 443 soldiers captured by the Soviets 359 were shot on 23 November near the town of Bazar, in the Zhytomyr region, and 84 were passed on to Soviet security forces.

The Second Winter Campaign brought the Ukrainian-Soviet War to a definite conclusion. The partisan movement in Ukraine, 1918–22 remained active until mid-1922, but conventional military action by regular troops had ceased.